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Abstract
The workhorse of urban labor theory in development economics is
the formal/informal model of labor market segmentation and its vari-
ants. A key prediction of the competitive theory of formal and informal
labor markets is that if labor costs in the formal market increase, formal
market employers lay off workers who move to the informal market, in-
creasing informal labor supply and depressing informal market wages.
However, there is considerable evidence that suggests that higher wages
in the formal labor market are often associated with higher wages in
the informal market. While it is possible to augment the standard
theory to yield results consistent with this apparent inconsistency I
choose instead to depart from the usual competitive framework. In
particular, I consider the theory of formal and informal labor markets
under oligopsony/monopsonistic competition.
1 Introduction
The workhorse of urban labor theory in development economics is the for-
mal/informal model of labor market segmentation and its variants. The ba-
sic story is that the formal labor market is subject to regulation (e.g., payroll
taxes, mandatory benefits, minimum wages, etc.), the informal market is not
and perfect competition equilibrates labor supply and labor demand in each
of these markets. Workers and/or firms may be mobile across markets. One
of its key predictions is that if labor costs in the formal market increase,
formal market employers lay off workers who move to the informal market,
increasing informal labor supply and depressing informal market wages.
The evidence, however suggests that this is not necessarily the case. In
particular, there is evidence that higher wages in the formal labor market are
often associated with higher wages in the informal market. As one example,
Gindling and Terrell (2005) look at formal and informal workers and find
that formal and informal wages both increase with an increase in minimum
wages.
Modifications can be made to the standard theory which yield results
consistent with this apparent inconsistency. For example, if queuing up for
more highly paid formal sector jobs requires being unemployed, then an
increase in formal sector wages can lead to an increase in informal sector
wages when formal sector labor demand is sufficiently inelastic (Gramlich,
1976; Hamermesh, 1993; Card and Krueger, 1995). Alternatively, in a small
open economy an increase in formal sector wages raises wages in the informal
sector while reducing the capital rental rate (Harrison and Leamer, 1997).
But because it is a small open economy, the increase in labor costs cannot
be passed on to consumers as higher prices. As a result, capital moves from
the formal sector to the informal sector, driving up wages in the informal
sector.
While these embellishments appear to be consistent with the co-move-
ment of formal and informal wages, they rely on assumptions that may be
less than believable. The former theory may be sensible in a rural (infor-
mal) to urban (formal) migration context (e.g., Harris and Todaro, 1970),
however, the requirement that workers must be unemployed to queue for
formal sector jobs is less satisfactory in a purely urban environment where
it is not clear why workers currently engaged in informal work should be
ineligible for formal sector jobs. Similarly, the latter theory requires capital
to be mobile between the formal and informal sectors. While capital mobil-
ity from large, formal enterprises to informal enterprises may make sense in
some cases, it is less plausible that small informal mom-and-pop businesses
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have the same access to financing that large formal businesses have.
An alternative is to depart from the usual competitive framework. Within
the realm of imperfectly competitive models of labor markets are efficiency
wage models (Albrecht and Vroman, 1998), job search models (Mortensen
and Burdett, 1998) and oligopsony/monopsonistic competition models (Bhaskar
et al., 2002). Because they are dynamic models, efficiency wages and search
involve a good deal of technical machinery and as such are more cumbersome
for policy analysis.
Since, at the end of the day, development economists are interested in
policy analysis, I model imperfectly competitive formal and informal labor
markets using a “monopsony-type” model of labor markets. Spacial models
like those used in Bhaskar and To (1999) and Bhaskar et al. (2002) are
useful for certain types of analyses. However, because of the asymmetric
nature of employer interactions in these models, they become less appealing
when employers are heterogeneous (e.g., Bhaskar and To, 2003). For this
analysis I will use an alternative formulation where employers interact with
one another in a symmetric fashion, similar in flavor to a Dixit-Stiglitz model
of monopolistic competition.
Under oligopsony or monopsonistic competition, it is immediately appar-
ent that typical policy exercises will yield different results from the compet-
itive, formal/informal model of labor market segmentation. For example,
under oligopsony, a decrease in payroll taxes that leads to an increase in
formal sector wages will increase employment in the formal sector. This
increase in formal sector employment and wages has a spillover effect on
the informal labor market. With a decrease in payroll taxes, formal sector
employment rises, decreasing informal sector labor supply, driving informal
sector wages up. Similarly, a moderate increase in the minimum wage re-
duces the marginal labor cost (in contrast to average labor cost), resulting
in an increase in employment in the formal sector and as a result, labor
supply in the informal sector will fall, driving up informal sector wages. In
both cases, there is co-movement between formal and informal wages. Sim-
ilar analyses can be conducted for the case when employers can freely enter
and exit both the formal and informal labor markets (i.e., monopsonistic
competition).
Using a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function, the
establishment level elasticity of labor supply is approximately constant. I
then respectively analyze the effect of changes in the payroll tax and a
minimum wage on formal and informal market employment. In order to
examine informal wage spillovers from these policy changes, I then dispense




To ensure that labor supply is imperfectly elastic, we assume that different
jobs have different non-wage characteristics. These include the job specifica-
tion, hours of work, distance of the firm from the worker’s home, the social
environment in the workplace, etc. The importance of non-wage character-
istics has been recognized in the theory of compensating differentials, which
is a theory of vertical differentiation. Some jobs are good while other jobs
are bad, and wage differentials compensate workers for these differences
in characteristics. We assume that jobs are horizontally differentiated so
that workers have heterogenous preferences over these characteristics. Mc-
Cue and Reed (1996) provide survey evidence of horizontal heterogeneity in
worker preferences. Heterogeneous preferences over non-wage characteris-
tics ensures that each employer has market power in wage setting, even if it
competes with many other employers.
Suppose that a representative worker has utility function:
U = IαL1−α (1)
where I is money income, L is the fraction of total time spent in leisure and
α determines the representative worker’s preferences between income and


















ρ is aggregate labor supplied, N is the number of employ-
ers and ρ determines the elasticity of labor supply. Assume U is concave;
sufficient conditions for concavity are ρ > 1.
Consider this to be the reduced form utility function for the labor mar-
ket as a whole where workers have heterogenous preferences over jobs. For
example, Anderson et al. (1992) have demonstrated for the product mar-
ket that heterogenous consumers can be represented in aggregate with a
representative utility function.
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Given a set of wage offers, the worker maximizes utility by choosing

















 1ρ−1 lρ−1k = 0. (2)
Some straightforward manipulation shows that
L = 1− α (3)
That is, the fraction of time spent at leisure activities is fixed at 1 − α.
The representative worker’s problem in this case becomes the simpler one of





Using the methods in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), it is straightforward to













where β = ρ/(ρ − 1). When N is relatively large, the effect of a change in






Since ρ > 1, labor supply is not infinitely elastic at the establishment level,
as under perfect competition.
Assume that there are nf and ni employers (where nf + ni = N) in
the formal and informal labor markets where formal sector employers are
numbered k = 1, 2, . . . , nf and informal sector employers are numbered k =
nf + 1, nf + 2, . . . , N . In the formal labor market, in addition to the wage,
employers are subject to a payroll tax of tf per dollar per hour. Employers
have marginal revenue products of φf and φi where φf/(1 + tf ) > φi so
that, net of payroll taxes, employers in the formal labor market are more
productive.
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Employer k chooses wk to maximize its profit:
πk = (φk − (1 + tk)wk)lk (7)
where tk = tf if employer k is a formal market employer and tk = 0 if em-
ployer k is an informal market employer. Employer k’s first order condition
is:
(φk − (1 + tk)wk)
∂lk
∂wk
− (1 + tk)lk = 0





Since ρ > 1, workers are paid less than their marginal product, net of tk
and since φf/(1 + tf ) > φi, workers in the formal labor market are paid
more than those in the informal labor market (i.e., w∗f > w
∗
i ). Since all
formal market employers pay wage w∗f and informal market employers pay









where t = f for a formal market employer and t = i for an informal market
employer.
3 Payroll taxes
Since equilibrium wages are a decreasing function of the rate of payroll
taxation (i.e., ∂w∗f/∂tf = −φf/ρ(1 + tf )2 < 0), a decrease in the payroll
tax will lead to an increase in the formal sector wage rate. To examine the
effect of a payroll tax decrease, I compute the effect of a formal sector wage
increase.
3.1 No entry or exit
Although not necessarily realistic, it is useful and instructive to first consider
the case when entry and exit is not prohibited. A decrease in payroll taxes or
an increase in the minimum wage both serve to increase wf . Differentiating


































Since there is no entry or exit, if establishment level formal employment
increases then total formal employment increases. Similarly since estab-
lishment level informal employment falls, total informal employment must
fall.
3.2 Free entry and exit
Now consider free entry, so that nf and ni adjust to eliminate profits. As-
sume that because of limited capital available for formal enterprises, formal
employers have a fixed production cost of cf (nf ) that is increasing in nf .
On the other hand, that informal employers’ capital requirements are much
more flexible and as a result, they have constant fixed production cost of ci.





Note that this implies that under monopsonistic competition with free entry
and exit, establishment sizes remain constant.
The equilibrium number of employers in free entry, n∗f and n
∗
i , is given






















These can be straightforwardly solved for ni as a function of nf :























ni nfi (nf )
nii(nf )
Figure 1: Equilibrium number of employers
To consider conditions under which a solution exists, differentiate each






















Note first that ∂nfi ∂nf < ∂n
i
i∂nf < 0. Thus a necessary condition for a solu-
tion is that nfi (0) > n
i
i(0) for which φf/cf (0) > φi/ci is sufficient. Next note
that in order that there is an intersection, it must be that c′f (nf )/[cf (nf )]
ρ+1
should not fall too quickly. One such example is






for some constant K and nf < K. In this case, c′f (nf )/[cf (nf )]
ρ+1 is con-
stant at 1. Finally, it must be that the difference between nfi (0) and n
i
i(0)
is not too large. These ideas are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Having established conditions for the existence of an equilibrium where
both n∗f and n
∗






response to a change in the rate of payroll taxation. Totally differentiating


























































where ξf is the formal-employer, fixed-production-cost elasticity with respect



















Using Cramer’s rule and simplifying, an increase in the formal-employer
wage rate (e.g., from a payroll tax decrease) will have the following effects




































































Since establishment level employment in the formal and informal sectors are
constant and the formal (informal) number of employers increases with an
increase in the formal sector wage rate, total formal (informal) employment
increases (decreases). By extention, since a decrease in the payroll tax leads
to an increase in the formal sector wage, a payroll tax decrease results in






4.1 No entry or exit
For a moderately chosen minimum wage, a minimum wage reduces the
marginal cost of labor (Stigler, 1946) and formal market employers will hire
as many additional workers as are willing to work for them at the minimum.
Thus without entry or exit, the analysis is idential to that for payroll taxes
and a minimum wage will increase formal sector employment while reducing
informal sector employment.
4.2 Free entry and exit
With minimum wages, the profit maximizing calculus changes and as a
result, free entry instead implies:




φf − (1 + tf )wm
(18)
In constrast to the analysis of payroll taxes, a minimum wage will increase
the size of formal sector establishments under free entry and exit.
Together (18) and (9) imply:
(nmf wm






= wmβ(φf − (1 + tf )wm)ρ (19)
Totally differentiating (19) and (14) with respect to nmf , n
m
i and wm and

















































Again, we can use Cramer’s rule to derive the effect of a change in the

















That is, an increase in a just binding minimum wage results in no exit of
formal employers but induces exit among informal employers. Although
at an individual level, a minimum wage reduces profitability and induces
exit, in aggregate, a minimum wage results in an increase in labor supply
to the formal sector, increasing profitability. In net, these opposing effects
cancel with the result that there is no extry or exit to the formal labor
market. However, this result must be kept in perspective. Similar to the
envelope theorem arguments used in Card and Krueger (1995) and Rebitzer
and Taylor (1995), at the margin, a minimum wage will have a negligible
effect of formal employer profitability—a large increase in the minimum
wage will undoubtedly result in the exit of formal sector employers. Since
some informal sector workers move to the formal sector, labor supply in
the informal sector falls, reducing profitability of informal sector employers,
resulting in firm exit in the informal sector.
Using these results, consider total employment:


























































Since w∗f > w
∗
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